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and, finally, the devices of control and guarantee of economic efficiency of those
engaged in the managerial and productive activities. It would seem that some
such scheme of arrangement would increase the usefulness of the rich materials
of the book.
In connection with the strictly legal institutions, an American reader may
often wonder at what he may regard as Soviet peculiarities. However, Soviet
law qua law does not present many features which might not also be found in
other countries, ardent Soviet claims to originality notwithstanding. After all,
where law is to reign the problems are by and large the same all the modern
world over, and the stock of available solutions is limited. Private, procedural
and criminal law of the U.S.S.R. have grown upon the soil of the long tradition
of Western civilization and, in view of the close contacts with Western and
Central Europe of both Marxism and Russia, it was inevitable for Soviet law
to build upon the foundations of the civil law traditions of the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries. Obviously, these institutions had to be adapted to the new
setting; but even the most conspicuous contribution of Soviet law, the farreaching role of the prosecutor as the guardian of the law, has its roots in the
legal systems of FranCe, Germany and Czarist Russia. These connections of
Soviet law with the general stream of Western legal development are hardly,
if ever, indicated in our book. However, if the reader is not made aware of these
antecedents and parallels, his view may easily be distorted.
As a final wish, one would like to see an index, a translation of the titles of
the Soviet publications listed in the Table of Abbreviations and, perhaps, some
guide to the pronunciation of all the Russian words and names. There should
also be explanations of those numerous abbreviated names of administrative
and economic agencies which appear in the text.
MAX RiEEINSTEIN*

Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry. By Harold D. Lasswell
and Abraham Kaplan. New Haven: Yale University Press, i95o. Pp. xxiv,
295. 84.oo.

Of all political scientists, Harold D. Lasswell has turned most vigorously
from the shadows of the cave. Working now alone, then again with extraordinary associates, he has produced a series of remarkable studies over twenty
years. The terms "challenging," "exaggerated," and "unusual,"--with a grudging, querulous air about them-have often been applied to his books by illustrious men who ought to know better. When one thinks of that strange compote which has been political science-demi-law, quasi-history, semi-morality,
and metaphysics, with many seeds of empirical generalization-and then examines Lasswell's works, he must perceive that they deserve the highest
admiration and respect. It may be that the science of human relations will be
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forever beyond us, and that Lasswell will one day resume his place among us
gibbering at the shadows, but he will have reached there-almost. And that
is the act that divides the men from the boys in the history of the intellect.
Now Professor Lasswell, in collaboration with a philosopher of the Viennese
Positivist School, gives us a book of political theory, general and systematic.
We wonder about it. Will it be ingenious, convenient, a self-summary, a jogging
in place, like his Politics: Who Gets What, When, How (1936), his Power and
Personality(1948), and his portion of the Language of Politics (1949)? Will it
be brilliant, but in a tradition, like his Democracy Through Public Opinion
(194i), or his World Politics Faces Economics (1945), or his National Security
and IndividualFreedom (1950)? Or will it be a pioneering study, startling in its
findings and bold in its method, as were his PropagandaTechnique in the World
War (1927), Psychopathology and Politics (1930), World Politics and Personal
Insecurity (i935), World Revolutionary Propaganda(1939), and several of his
papers in The Analysis of PoliticalBehavior (1947)? This reviewer places Power
and Society with the last group of Lasswell's works. The authors have stated the
elements of political science better than they have ever been stated before. This
I think it fair to say, although many great problems yet obscure the way to a
new order of political science.
The new work differs from all of Lasswell's work to this point, save his
Politics,in that it gives a complete presentation of the basic principles of political behavior, and it differs from his Politicsby treating formal political structures as well as political behavior. Thus it is the most general of his studies, and
the only one which undertakes the Herculean task of joining behavioral and
formal concepts. Some one hundred and fifty-one major definitions and some
ninety-six propositions are stated about the important areas of political science.
The scope of political science is the struggle for power (participation in the making of decisions) for the sake of power itself and of various other basic values
(desired events). The base values are conceptualized as power, respect, rectitude, affection, well-being, wealth, skill, and enlightenment. Since greatest
power is centered in political institutions, political institutions remain, with the
authors as with tradition, the center of attention in political science.
The various chapter titles indicate the scope of political science in detail. A
proper conceptualization of the field requires definitions and propositions in the
several areas of Persons, Perspectives, Groups, Influence, Power, Symbols,
Practices, Functions, Structures, and Process. An example of a major definition
in the area of Persons is Catharsis, which is defined as "a reduction of intensity
(of the actor) with a minimum of change in the factors determining intensity."
An example of a proposition regarding Persons is: "The probability of catharsis
varies directly with the extent of conflict and inversely with the intensity of the
situation."
An example of a definition in the field of Structures is: "A rule is egalitarian
in the degree to which elite recruitment is based on values to which there is
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equal access." And a proposition in the same area is: "The stability of democratic rule varies with the democratic features of the social order." One hastens
to explain, in connection with these examples, that the terms employed in major
definitions and propositions are defined in preceding major definitions. Thus, the
words "rule," "democracy," and "social order," in the last proposition, have
been previously defined. Following each major definition and major proposition
is a paragraph or more of explanation, comment, minor definitions, and related
propositions.
A consistent, interlocking set of major definitions is a difficult achievement.
The authors seem to have accomplished the feat. The reviewer carried one major
definition through perhaps two dozen related meanings without detecting circularity, essential redundancy, or inconsistency. Doubtless, certain of the definitions will turn out to be unnecessary; that is, they will factor out into other
definitions and the things to which they refer can be as easily manipulated
through the use of the other terms. An easy example of such a word is "statesman," which, I believe, forms a relatively useless contrast to "politician."
Also, certain definitions will be found to be non-operational and must be
dispensed with or modified. For example, I do not see the particular utility of
many of the concepts in the tables on social process and forms of influence and
power, though the finesse of the authors in building these tables of interrelated
concepts relating to basic values is amazing. This is the second time these tables
have been printed, once before in Power and Personality. I hope that their third
appearance will be marked by a detailed demonstration of their operational
utility. In treating of the forms of government, too, the authors cannot resist
the rich and vague vocabulary of traditional political writings, and produce a
masterpiece of baroque semantics. Again we are given little idea of what concretely can be done with these terms. Perhaps here, however, I underestimate
the value of having somewhere to turn for precise usages of well-worn words.
I would point out, however, that the free coinage of special meanings for
terms having ancient histories may be correct in principle but wrong from the
standpoint of the sociology of establishing a science. When the authors rework
words like "democracy" and "tyranny" and go on to others more strange, like
"gangster," "pundit," and "approbation," and give them special meaning,
they walk straight into the war of words. The chance of a vocabulary of this
sort acquiring fixity and employment among social scientists is nil. The economists have not even been able to keep "price," "supply," and "investment"
stable in meaning. Perhaps the authors only prolong the grief of political
scientists as they encounter politicians and public. It might be better to convert
these couple of hundred words into constructed words or symbols, no more
difficult to memorize or refer to than common words with special meanings, but
less confusing to political scientists and less subject to ministerpretation and
abuse by laymen. The present effort at precise terminology, it is fair to say, will
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rest as the best available. If a symbolic logician were to work them over, we
might fall into his debt.
The stress on terminology has its effects on the propositions of the book. The
propositions are neatly and simply stated, though they will have an unfamiliar
ring to most readers and, indeed, most political scientists. Some of the propositions will disappoint readers who will find them to be disguised versions of common-sense expressions. Take the proposition, "Ruling practices are limited by
the social order." In loose form, this means that the customs of a people influence the actions of officials. Nothing new or striking here. In one sense, such
banalities are necessary parts of a work that aims to give the most important
propositions of political science. Obvious truths are part of any system of
truths. Only literature, with aesthetic motive, may exclude the banal. On
closer sight, however, we are not so sure that any principle may be termed
banal when it is accurately stated, its terms are definite, and especially when it
is part of a system. It belongs, it hangs together with other major propositions,
it is not a separate, clumsy witticism.
This "banality" of some of the propositions is not a bad effect of the novel
terminology in any but a minor sense. More serious is the occasional failure of
the authors to pursue the elaboration of propositions as the major task of the
work. In various places, one gets the impression that the authors, though claiming a non-Aristotelian approach, outdo the Master in their profusion of classifications. The remarkable seductiveness of definitions may be at the root of the
authors' inattention to a major objective-to substitute for a science of species
''a science of functional co-relations."

Few major propositions in the work are compound propositions. That is, the
bulk of propositions are simple-they state one important co-variation. For
example, the proposition is stated that "In a society with a stable social structure, the ideology is a matter of consensus, not of opinion." An earlier compound
proposition reads: "An opinion aggregate is the more likely to attain solidarity
the more highly controversial the opinion, and the more the aggregate is in a
minority." The book lacks propositions of a character to bridge these two
propositions, such as would be the one: Solid opinion aggregates and minority
opinion aggregates are unlikely to be found in societies with a stable social order.
As a matter of fact, the last proposition could have been selected in the first
place in lieu of either of the others.
We conclude, therefore, that many important propositions are missing from
the book, and that the authors have selected major propositions with some
degree of intuition, rather than according to some master reasoning or natural
cause. Hundreds of other propositions might easily be added to those presented
in the book without significantly decreasing the validity, reliability, and degree
of generality of the average proposition. Yet, this writer could make no better
defense of such new propositions than may be made for the present ones. Per-
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haps the only utility of my remark, then, is to indicate that the authors have
only sampled the universe of propositions, that individual substitutions might
be made, and that there is yet no unshakable central foundation for holding
only a certain kind of proposition and grading such propositions into a hierarchy.
Power and Society follows Lasswellian and Positivist precedent in avoiding
commitments to stipulated "goods" or values. Political science is to be the
theory of human political relations, not the theory of the good state. The latter
is political doctrine. The "amoral" approach, now one of the strongest in American political science, owes something to a facet of Aristotle, but relates more
closely to Niccolb Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes, Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo
Pareto, Roberto Michels, and Charles E. Merriam. Jeremy Bentham, Auguste
Comte, Karl Marx, Sigmund Freud, Max Weber, John Dewey, George Herbert
Mead, G. E. G. Catlin, Charles Beard, and Harold J. Laski also play a part in
the establishment of the tradition. The "objectivity" of this powerful group of
Continental and American writers is to be construed as presenting propositions
about political events that may be true and meaningful to Chinese or Americans, communists or capitalists. The findings are to rest upon facts, not beliefs.
However, the authors' goal of fact objectivity is not completely attained. An
uneasiness grips certain statements, causing them to border upon values rather
than facts. As with the "objectivity" of Machiavelli, Mosca, Pareto, Dewey,
and the other writers in the "scientific" tradition, the "objectivity" of Lasswell
and Kaplan remains conditional and imperfect. There is a poet in Lasswell that
marks his work as not pure within its premises. He extols (xxiv, 14, et passim)
humanism and the use of political science for establishing "human dignity and
the realization of human capacities."
And here, as in other works, Lasswell implies a huge proposition that he never
states but always skirts: "The problem of politics may be less to solve conflicts
than to prevent them; less to serve as a safety valve for social protest than to
apply social energy to the abolition of recurrent sources of strain in society
(p. I5)." There lurks within this kind of statement a whole philosophy of moralfactual identification, a natural law theory, a belief in the "balanced, normal"
man as the objective of social science. To this point in time, however, such remarks are to be considered intrusive in Lasswellian theory; they are unassimilated and abashed.
A final major methodological characteristic of the work is its insistence that
a theory which rests on facts must be testable by facts. "Theorizing, even about
politics, is not to be confused with metaphysical speculation in terms of abstractions hopelessly removed from empirical observation and control." Theory must
be operational. It must be phrased as hypotheses which can be proved or disproved, as generalizations which may acquire status as more or less valid, more
or less reliable. Parts may have to be canceled out, parts negatived, without the

X95r]

BOOK REVIEWS

whole structure of theory falling to pieces. Furthermore, no essential part must
have to rest always on faith, thus contaminating the whole system's validity.
Obviously, showing just how operational the theory of Power andSociety can
be is beyond a single work. The authors indicate that the theory is so by illustrating their propositions profusely from existing general works in political
science. In fact, there is a startling amount of relevant material in the literature
of the field and a notable contribution of this study is its translations of the
fact statements of classicists, who have been relegated to oblivion by most contemporary empiricists, into terms conforming well to the theories of the book.
The authors might, with several more years of work, have fitted into their
theories the multitude of "minor" articles and monographs written, principally
in America, over the past half century. These myriad and scintillating fragments
have already given us a political science in America, capable, when properly
stated, of far surpassing the political science of the Greeks, Italians, Englishmen, Germans, and Frenchmen.
Ultimately, and this is too much to demand of a single work, the theories of
the book should be subjected to the crucible of practice; seminars should be devoted to designing studies, using the theories of this work, and to preparing
empirical reports on the results of the studies. Only then will we truly begin to
know how deep, how strong, and how useful is the structure of Lasswellian
political science.
ALFRECD DE GnRxze*

Conflict of Laws: Cases and Materials. By Fowler V. Harper, Charles W.
Taintor II, Charles Wendell Carnahan, and Ralph S. Brown, Jr. Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, i95o. Pp. xxxix, ogo. $7.50.
This new volume is a truly good casebook which any instructor can use with
a great deal of satisfaction. It is essentially a modification and rearrangement of
the Harper and Taintor volume of 1937 and definitely an improvement.
The editors adhere to the basic plan of the former book. In the first two chapters they offer material on the nature and bases of the conflict of laws and such
technical matters as renvoi and qualifications, substance and procedure, and
public policy. The second group of materials is on the so-called "choice of law"
rules, the third on jurisdiction, and the fourth on the impact of the Federal Constitution on the conflict of laws in the United States. This is orderly and logical:
underlying principles are considered before the ramifications of the conflict of
laws itself, and this before the constitutional limitations superimposed on conflicts law in the United States. It is not to be expected that every instructor will
agree that this arrangement of materials, logical as it is, represents the best
pedagogical approach. The first chapters on the nature and bases of conflicts
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